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Abstract. We propose to apply a variant of forgetting, a simple method
to restore consistency, in order to get a new inconsistency measure from
the following intuitive idea: How much effort is needed to restore consis-
tency of a knowledge base is presumably indicative of how inconsistent
the knowledge base is. We discuss properties of the inconsistency measure
obtained, in particular in the face of well-known postulates for inconsis-
tency measures. We also mention in what sense this new measure does
not fall into the dichotomy of inconsistency measures proposed in the
literature: alphabet-based approaches vs formula-based approaches.
1 Introduction
Inconsistency measures have gained much interest recently (Ammoura et al.
2015; Grant and Hunter 2013; Hunter et al. 2014; Jabbour et al. 2015, 2016; Liu
and Mu 2016; McAreavey et al. 2014; Mu et al. 2012; Mu 2015; Thimm 2013,
2016a, 2016b; Thimm and Wallner 2016; Xiao and Ma 2012). An inconsistency
measure ascribes a quantity to a logical knowledge base, a quantity which is
meant to tell how inconsistent the knowledge base is. Here, we apply forgetting
(Lin and Reiter 1994), a well-known method to restore consistency (Lang and
Marquis 2002), in order to get a new inconsistency measure from the following
idea: How much effort is needed to restore consistency of a knowledge base is
presumably indicative of how inconsistent the knowledge base is.
1.1 Formal Preliminaries
By a knowledge base, we mean a finite multiset of formulas of propositional logic.
We use ¬, ∧, ∨ to denote the usual Boolean connectives: negation, conjunction,
disjunction. We use Greek letters ϕ, ψ, . . ., whether indexed or not, to denote
formulas of propositional logic. We use capital Greek letters ∆, Γ ,. . . to denote 
knowledge bases (i.e., multisets of formulas of propositional logic, as just said).
We use κ (which is introduced in Definition 1) to denote forgetting: Intuitively, 
κ “forgets” occurrences of a propositional variable.
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2 An Inconsistency Measure
We consider formulas labelled with superscripts denoting occurrences of atoms.
Every formula ϕ in which an unlabelled atom v occurs k > 0 times is identified
as ϕ(v1, . . . , vk) where vi denotes the ith unlabelled occurrence of v in ϕ.1
Example. The unlabelled formula a ∧ b ∧ ¬ b is identified with the labelled
formula a1 ∧ b1 ∧ ¬b2.
Accordingly, given the list of propositional variables P = v1, v2, . . . define the
set of atom occurrences as
A
def
=
⋃
v∈P
{v1, v2, . . .}
Importantly, vi is identified with vj for all purposes (e.g., consistency issues)
except for purposes of occurrences of atoms. In particular, a Boolean combination
of labelled formulas may display multiple copies of the same atom occurrence
e.g., (a1 ∧ b1 ∧ ¬b2)
∣∣ b1 → ⊤,⊥ (see below) is (a1 ∧ ⊤ ∧ ¬b2) ∨ (a1 ∧ ⊥ ∧ ¬b2).
Notation. The symbol → is used for substitution as follows.
ϕ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
v
i1
1
→ ψ1
...
v
ih
k
→ ψh
denotes the formula resulting from ϕ by replacing simultaneously each atom
occurrence v
ij
j by ψj (informally speaking, an atom occurrence refers either to
an unlabelled occurrence of the atom or to a labelled version of the atom).
The abbreviation
m∨
1
ϕ
∣∣ vi→ ψ1,...,ψm
is used to denote the disjunction whose each disjunct is the formula obtained
from ϕ by replacing vi by one of ψ1, . . . , ψm in turn.
Example. Taking ϕ to be a1∧b1∧¬b2∧(b3∨¬(a1∧b1)), the substitution of b1 by
⊤ in ϕ is denoted by ϕ |(b1→ ⊤) , yielding a1∧⊤∧¬b2∧ (b3∨¬(a1∧⊤)). That is,
all occurrences of b1 in ϕ are replaced by occurrences of ⊤. Also,
∨
ϕ
∣∣ b1→ ⊤,⊥
denotes [a1 ∧ ⊤ ∧ ¬b2 ∧ (b3 ∨ ¬(a1 ∧ ⊤))] ∨ [a1 ∧ ⊥ ∧ ¬b2 ∧ (b3 ∨ ¬(a1 ∧ ⊥))].
Definition 1. κi,v.ϕ is the labelled formula obtained from the labelled formula
2
ϕ by replacing the atom occurrences vi in ϕ, first by ⊤, second by ⊥, taking the
disjunction thereof. In symbols,
κi,v.ϕ
def
= ϕ(v1, . . . , vi−1,⊤, vi+1, . . . , vk) ∨ ϕ(v1, . . . , vi−1,⊥, vi+1, . . . , vk)
1 As to labelling, logical constants ⊤ and ⊥ are not considered atoms: A formula in
which either occurs is regarded as labelled if all other atoms in it are superscripted.
2 That is, if ϕ is unlabelled, it is identified with ϕ(v11 , . . . , v
i1
1
, . . . , v1p, . . . , v
ip
p ) where
v1, . . . , vp are all the propositional variables in ϕ.
For clarity, let us stress that κi,v.ϕ is a labelled formula hence κj,u.(κi,v.ϕ) is
such that κj,u introduces no superscript (but it duplicates superscripted atoms).
Lemma 1. Using the substitution notation,
κi1,v1 .κi2,v2 . · · · .κih,vh .ϕ =
2h∨
1
ϕ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
v
i1
1
→⊤,⊥
...
v
ih
h
→⊤,⊥
In previous work (Lin and Reiter 1994; Lang and Marquis 2002; Lang et al.
2003) about forgetting, it is shown that consistency can be recovered if enough
atoms are forgotten. It is of interest to characterize which occurrences of atoms
are enough to consider if consistency is to be recovered.
Definition 2. Define σ(ϕ) as the set of multisets of atom occurrences whose
forgetting is enough to turn ϕ into a consistent formula, in symbols,
σ(ϕ)
def
= {A ⊆ A | ∃h∃vi11 ..v
ih
h , A = {v
i1
1 , . . . , v
ih
h }, κi1,v1 .κi2,v2 . · · · .κih,vh .ϕ 	⊢ ⊥}.
Then, the inconsistency number of ϕ is intuitively the minimum number n
of (iterated) applications of κ operators such that κi1,v1 .κi2,v2 . · · · .κih,vh .ϕ 	⊢ ⊥
i.e. such that ϕ is turned into a consistent formula.
Definition 3. The inconsistency number of Γ is n(Γ ), defined as
n(Γ )
def
= min
A∈σ(∧Γ )
| A |
Reminder. Before turning to the examples, it is important to repeat that vi is
identified with vj for most purposes, including consistency issues. For instance,
in Example 2, (⊤∧ a2)∧ (¬a3 ∧¬a4) is inconsistent because it is identified with
(⊤ ∧ ai) ∧ (¬ai ∧ ¬ai) which is inconsistent, whatever i.
Example 1. Let Γ1 = {a ∨ a,¬a ∨ ¬a}. Then,
∧
Γ1 = (a
1 ∨ a2) ∧ (¬a3 ∨ ¬a4).
{a1} ∈ σ(Γ1) since κ1,a.
∧
Γ1 is [(⊤∨a
2)∧ (¬a3∨¬a4)]∨ [(⊥∨a2)∧ (¬a3∨¬a4)]
which is consistent. Hence n(Γ1) = 1.
Example 2. Let Γ2 = {a ∧ a,¬a ∧ ¬a}. Hence,
∧
Γ2 = (a
1 ∧ a2) ∧ (¬a3 ∧ ¬a4).
It does not matter whether considering a1 instead of a2 and a3 instead of a4.
κ1,a.
∧
Γ2 is [(⊤∧a
2)∧(¬a3∧¬a4)]∨[(⊥∧a2)∧(¬a3∧¬a4)] which is inconsistent.
κ3,a.κ1,a.
∧
Γ2 is [(⊤∧ a
2) ∧ (¬⊤∧¬a4)] ∨ [(⊥∧ a2) ∧ (¬⊤∧¬a4)] ∨ [(⊤∧ a2) ∧
(¬⊥∧¬a4)]∨ [(⊥∧ a2)∧ (¬⊥∧¬a4)] i.e. [⊥∨⊥]∨ [⊥∨⊥] which is inconsistent
(and so is κ4,a.κ1,a.
∧
Γ2). However, κ2,a.κ1,a.
∧
Γ2 is [(⊤ ∧⊤) ∧ (¬a
3 ∧ ¬a4)] ∨
[(⊥ ∧⊤) ∧ (¬a3 ∧ ¬a4)] ∨ [(⊤ ∧⊥) ∧ (¬a3 ∧ ¬a4)] ∨ [(⊥ ∧⊥) ∧ (¬a3 ∧ ¬a4)] i.e.
[(¬a3 ∧ ¬a4) ∨ ⊥] ∨ [⊥ ∨⊥], it is consistent. Hence, n(Γ2) = 2.
Keep in mind that n refers to the minimum amount of forgetting needed to
restore consistency. E.g., each of the knowledge bases Γ below satisfies n(Γ ) = 1.
{a,¬a}
{a ∧ a,¬a}
{a ∨ b, a ∨ ¬b,¬a ∨ b,¬a ∨ ¬b}
3 How Inconsistent About v?
Besides determining how inconsistent Γ is, it would be interesting to determine
how inconsistent Γ is about some v.
Definition 4. n |v (Γ )
def
= min
A∈σ(∧Γ )
| A ∩ {v}ω |
Notation. {v}ω denotes the multiset consisting of countably many copies of v.
Example 3. Let Γ3 = {(a ∧ ¬a) ∨ (b ∧ ¬b)}. Therefore, {b
1} ∈ σ(Γ3) because
κ1,b.
∧
Γ3 is [(a
1∧¬a2)∨ (⊤∧¬b2)]∨ [(a1∧¬a2)∨ (⊥∧¬b2)] which is consistent.
Hence, n |a (Γ3) = 0 due to {b
1} ∩ {a}ω being empty. Similarly, n |b (Γ3) = 0.
However, n(Γ3) = 1.
Comment. The reader may be unhappy that n |v (Γ ) = 0 captures both the case
that v is involved in no contradiction in Γ and the case (as in Example 3) that
v is involved in a contradiction together with at least another atom. There are
many ways to change Definition 4, e.g. by considering some liability function l
(with the constraint lv,σ(Γ ) > 1) so as to alternatively define n |v as follows:
n |v (Γ ) =


0 if A ∩ {v}ω = ∅ for all A ∈ σ(∧Γ )
minA∈σ(∧Γ ) | A ∩ {v}ω | if A ∩ {v}ω 	= ∅ for all A ∈ σ(∧Γ )
1/lv,σ(Γ ) otherwise
Anyway, knowledge bases can be compared in the following way: Γ is at least
as v-inconsistent as Γ ′ iff n |v (Γ ) ≥ n |v (Γ
′).
Lemma 2. If n(Γ ) ≥ n(Γ ′) then there exists an atom v such that Γ is at least
as v-inconsistent as Γ ′.
Lemma 3. n(Γ ) ≥ n(Γ ′) if for every v, Γ is at least as v-inconsistent as Γ ′.
It is also possible to compare the involvement of atoms in the conflicts of a
knowledge base. Therefore, if atoms can be mapped to topics, such a measure
n |v would permit to judge whether a topic gives rise to more severe conflicts
than some other topic, or to judge whether the overall inconsistency degree of
the knowledge base amounts to the inconsistency degree ascribed to such and
such topic. (Please keep in mind that “severe” only refers to intensity, there can
be a severe conflict about a topic of little importance.)
4 Postulates for Inconsistency Measures
We now turn to examining what postulates are satisfied by our inconsistency
measure n. In this respect, a useful lemma is the following one.
Lemma 4. For all j ≥ h, if κi1,v1 . · · · .κih,vh .ϕ 	⊢ ⊥ then κi1,v1 . · · · .κij ,vj .ϕ 	⊢ ⊥.
If ϕ 	⊢ ⊥ then for all j ≥ 0, κi1,v1 . · · · .κij ,vj .ϕ 	⊢ ⊥ (hence 2
A ⊆ σ(ϕ) for ϕ 	⊢ ⊥).
We begin with considering postulates proposed in Hunter and Konieczny (2010),
expressed using I to denote an arbitrary inconsistency measure.
– I(Γ ) = 0 iff Γ 	⊢ ⊥ (Consistency Null)
– I(Γ ∪ Γ ′) ≥ I(Γ ) (Monotony)
– If ϕ is free3 for Γ then I(Γ ∪ {ϕ}) = I(Γ ) (Free Formula Independence)
It happens that our inconsistency measure n satisfies the postulates above.
However, n fails the following postulate, also due to (Hunter and Konieczny
2010).
– If ϕ ⊢ ψ and ϕ 	⊢ ⊥ then I(Γ ∪ {ϕ}) ≥ I(Γ ∪ {ψ}) (Dominance)
Example 4. Let Γ = {¬a ∧ ¬a ∧ ¬a}. Take ϕ = a and ψ = a ∧ a ∧ a. Then,
n(Γ ∪ {ϕ}) = 1 but n(Γ ∪ {ψ}) = 3.
Failure of (Dominance) entails failure wrt the postulate (Besnard 2014) below
– if Γ ′ 	⊢ ⊥ and Γ ′ ≡ Γ ′′ then I(Γ ∪ Γ ′) = I(Γ ∪ Γ ′′) (Exchange)
Furthermore, our inconsistency measure n satisfies the following postulate,
introduced in Besnard (2014).
– if σΓ = Γ ′ and σ′Γ ′ = Γ for some substitutions σ and σ′ then I(Γ ) = I(Γ ′)
(Variant Equality)
Keeping in mind that Γ denotes a multiset of formulas, it is easy to check
that n satisfies the next postulate also introduced in Besnard (2014).
– I(Γ ∪ {ϕ,ψ}) = I(Γ ∪ {ϕ ∧ ψ}) (Adjunction Invariancy)
Since n satisfies both (Monotony) and (Adjunction Invariancy), it satisfies
– I(Γ ∪ {ϕ ∧ ψ}) ≥ I(Γ ∪ {ϕ}) (Conjunction Dominance)
Similarly, an easy consequence of (Free Formula Independence) is
– I(Γ ∪ {⊤}) = I(Γ ) (Tautology Independence)
which our inconsistency measure n satisfies as well as the related postulate
(Besnard 2014) below
– if ϕ ≡ ⊤ then I(Γ ∪ {ϕ ∧ ψ}) = I(Γ ∪ {ψ}) (⊤-conjunct Independence)
3 A formula ϕ is free for Γ iff ∆ ∪ {ϕ} ⊢ ⊥ for no consistent subset ∆ of Γ .
5 Conclusion
The inconsistency measure introduced in this paper shows two main distinc-
tive features. First, it deals with multisets of formulas. Second, it breaks the
dichotomy suggested in Hunter and Konieczny (2010) which splits the universe
of inconsistency measures into two categories: inconsistency measures based on
minimal inconsistent subsets and inconsistency measures based on the alphabet
(i.e., what atoms are involved in conflicts). Indeed, Example 4 is such that the
inconsistency value differs in two cases with isomorphic sets of minimal incon-
sistent subsets and also differs in two cases where the alphabet consists of one
propositional symbol.
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